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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
extraordinary remedy of sequestration is asked on the basis of legal
title, that the plaintiff must come forward with fairness and set
out a title, which, prima facie, is a good one." The court here apparently was not satisfied that the bill brought by X and the other
heirs, in view -of A's answer, set up that prima facie case, hence
it followed a sound rule in refusing the harsh decree sought. However, it must be stated that since sequestration is a conservative
process, error in issuing the writ does not prejudice the hearing on
the merits in the main case. 9
It is submitted, that the court in refusing to uphold the decree issued by the trial court followed the dictates of a sounder
policy and reached a proper and just decision.
H. G. W.
PROCEDURE-DEIURRER

TO MISJOINDER Or PARTnES UNDER

THE REVISED CODE. -A bond was executed by Doddridge County
Bank, as principal, and other defendants as sureties, to secure deposits of the plaintiff. On an action on this bond the defendants
moved to dismiss the case because of misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Held, that this procedure was irregular, since under the West
Virginia statute' all challenges of the sufficiency of pleadings
2
should be by demurrer. Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank.
Prior to the 1931 Revised Code of West Virginia it was
definitely established that a demurrer was the correct procedure
for raising an objection to misjoinder of parties.3 The new statute,
however, indicates that such a method is no longer proper.4 Under
the Virginia code provision' which served as a model for the West
Virginia statute it has been held consistently that the only method
s Griffin v. Carter, 40 N. C. 413 (1848); Parker v. Grammer, 62 N. C. 28
(1866).
9 See Note (1900) 49 L. R. A. 773; Ross v. Colville, 3 Call 382 (Va. 1803).
1W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 36.
2 194 S. E. 79 (W. Va. 1937).
3 Stewart v. Tams, 108 W. Va. 539, 151 S. E. 849 (1930); Fidelity, oe.
Co. v. Shaid, 103 W. Va. 432, 137 S. E. 878 (1927); Lambert v. County Court,
103 W. Va. 37, 136 S. E. 507 (1927) ; Hunt v. Mounts, 101 N. Va. 205, 133
S. E. 323 (1926). And see Jones and Carlin, Nonjoinder and 3Misjoinder of
Parties in Gomnmon Law Actions (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 197, 266; Comment
(1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 373.
action . . . shall abate or be defeated by the misjoinder or non4 "No
joinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant. Whenever such misjoinder shall be
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the parties misjoined shall be dropped
by order of the court, entered of its own accord or upon motion, at any stage
of the cause." W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 34.
5 VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 6102.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of objecting to misjoinder of parties is by a motion to abate as to
the parties improperly joined, and that a demurrer does not lie to
this defect." It is generally recognized that a provision similar to
the one now in force in this state abolishes all the common law
methods of objecting to misjoinder of parties,7 and West Virginia
decisions, in referring to the Virginia statute, appear to affirm
this proposition. s
It is a familiar rule of statutory interpretation that when a
statute of another state is adopted, the interpretation put upon it
by the courts of that state come with it; this rule is reenforced by
the Revisers' Note to the provision in the West Virginia Code.'
Furthermore, in the draft of the statute, the words "may be
dropped" are changed to "shall be dropped" so as to comply more
strictly with the interpretation set down by the Virginia courts.
West Virginia commentators have expressed the opinion that under the revised section a demurrer is not the proper method of objecting to misjoinder of parties.10
In the principal case the court states that under our present
practice all challenges of the sufficiency of pleadings should be by
demurrer. The code section as to joinder, however, states that no
action shall abate or be defeated by the misjoinder or nonjoinder
of parties plaintiff or defendant." It seems, therefore, that a misjoinder does not produce an insufficiency. To be the subject of a
demurrer in West Virginia the defect must be one which goes to
the operative effect of the pleading, as a pleading, and not to something which constitutes a mere extraneous condition precedent to
its availability.' 2 Also, a demurrer is in its nature a plea to the
GWebb v. United States Fidelity etc. Co., 165 Va. 388, 182 S. E. 557 (1935) ;
Ives v. Williams, 143 Va. 855, 129 S. E. 675 (1925) ; Virginia Hot Springs Co.
v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S. E. 408 (1925); Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va.
521, 88 S. E. 174 (1916), 4 A. L. R. 1480 (1919).
747 C. J. 225, Parties § 434 (citing Virginia cases supra note 6); BURx,
PLEADING AxD PRACTICE (2d ed. 1920) 63.
s Stewart v. Tams; Hunt v. Mounts, both supra n. 3.
0 As the revised section is similar to the Virginia statute, it is probable that
a similar holding will follow in this state thus changing our present decisions
as to misjoinder and possibly as to nonjoinder.
1o Lynch, Pleading and Practice Under the Revised Code (1930) 37 W. VA.
L. Q. 60, 67; Carlin, Parties to Actions and Suits Under the Revised Code
(1937) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 87, 107.
11 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 34.
12Carlin, Functions of a Demurrer Under the Revised Code (1935) 41 W.
VA. L. Q. 313, 317 (numerous citations supporting this theory).
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action,', the effect of. which is to defeat the action as stated. 14
Applying these principles to the phraseology of the code, it is evident that a demurrer to misjoinder of parties is improper.
The statute provides that whenever the misjoinder is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the misjoined parties shall be
dropped. Because of this wording, the court might treat a demurrer
as merely a notice of the misjoinder, abating the action as to improper parties, but proceeding to final judgment as to all parties
properly in the case.
J. H. H.
RELEASE OF CLAIM FOR PERSONAL INJURYAT LAW TO

Avom

IGHT IN ACTION
RELEASE BASED ON MUTUAL MIST-AKE OF FACT.-

Through the negligence of D, P, brakeman for D, was injured
February 25, 1935, while in discharge of his duties. On June 25,
1935, P for valuable consideration released D from all claims of
every kind for damages and injuries sustained. P sues for injuries
and seeks to avoid the effect of the release by alleging that at the
time the release was executed lie believed under advice of physicians, including physicians in employ of D, that his injuries were
not serious, but merely temporary whereas it later developed that
the injuries were serious and permanent. Held, that in the absence of fraud in procurement of a release of liability for personal
injuries, such release, if for valuable consideration, may not be
repudiated in an action at law by releasor for damages for the injury. Janney v. Virginian Railway Co.'
As suggested by the court in its opinion, there is a square
split of authority as to whether such a release may be repudiated
in an action at law for damages for injuries for which the release
was given. If you assume, as our court does, that there is an absolute right to relief in equity on these facts, 2 then we must con1 Tyler v. Hand, 7 How. 573, 12 L. Ed. 284 (U. S. 1849) ; F urniss v. Ellis
& Allen, 2 Brock. 14 (1822).
14 Davis Colliery Co. v. Westfall, 78 W. Va. 735, 90 S. E. 329 (1916); South
Br. R. Co. v. Long, 26 W. Va. 692 (1885); Corrothers v. Sargent, 20 W. Va.
351 (1882); Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1104.
1193 S. E. 187 (W. Va. 1937).
2
Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Metz, 70 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934);
Greer v. Fargagon Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. 242, 77 S. W. (2d) 443, 96 A. L. R.
1141 (1935). For a general discussion of the right to relief assuming it is
sought in the proper form see Notes (1907) 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 663; (1908)
11 L. B. A. (N.s.) 201; (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 449; (1914) 50 L.
R. A. (Y. s.) 1091; L. R. A. 1916B 776; L. R. A. 1916D 144; (1927) 48 A.
L. R. 1462. See also Comments (1928) 26 Miui. L. REv 828; (1935) 21 IowA
L. REv. 146; (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 805.
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